Introduction
Law, whether divine or manmade, is always for the well-being of the human beings. In other words, laws are ultimately related to life experiences which are not a monopoly of the theologians only.
1 As the society is not any constant phenomenon, it inevitably changes every moment. As a result laws are needed to be changed in compliance with the changing demands of the society. In Islamic Legal System as well the iron fist of taqlid (the doctrine of imitation) had to give way to ijtihad (meaning independent and free exercise of intellect to interpret interpretation of Islamic laws). It is always open for and permitted to, the thinkers, lawmakers and the rulers who are entrusted to apply shariah in society. In this short commentary I intend to address a particular issue relating to the orphaned children's inheritance right. This is an extremely practical anomaly of the Doctrine of Representation usually escaping our notice.
Grandchild's inheritance right: the Islamic Law
The Islamic law of inheritance does not all together deny the grandchild of the propositus their right to inheritance. Sunni Law places them in the list of quranic sharers. Unless excluded otherwise, they inherit from their grandparent. The doctrine of representation comes into question in case of allotment of their shares. The doctrine is accepted at least for two purposes: 2 A) For the purpose of determining who are entitled to inherit However while using the doctrine of representation for the purpose of determining who are entitled to inherit, the principle of exclusion (nearer in degree excluding the remote) is not curtailed or suspended. Thus if A dies leaving him surviving a son and grandsons by a predeceased son, the grandsons are excluded from inheritance by their uncle. They do not take in their father's stead though he would have been an heir had he survived his father. This is true in Shia and Sunni Law alike.
B) For the purpose of determining the share of the heirs
But if both sons predeceased the propositus who died leaving three grandsons by one son and two by the other then all the grandsons are heirs. In that case, the principle of representation is applied in Shia Law for the purpose of ascertaining the share of each grandson. If the principle is applied, the estate of the propositus shall be distributed per stripes among the grandchild. The grandsons of one branch will have to divide into three what the grandsons of other branch will divide in half. However Sunni Law does not recognize representation in that case. The five grand sons shall inherit per capita in their own rights as heirs of the propositus, not as the representatives of the predeceased son or daughter. Thus it is clear that Section 4 of the MFLO, 1961 has accommodated the doctrine of representation by suspending the rule of nearer excluding the remote. It has also incorporated into Sunni Law, the Shia concept of stirpital succession. Now the orphaned grand children are per stripes allotted the share which their deceased parents would have taken had he or she survived the propositus.
Anomalies of Section 4: Pakistani approach
This accommodation of stirpital succession has caused some anomalies with which the Courts in Pakistan had to deal with at least in three cases.
Mst. Zarina Jan v. Mst. Akbar Jan PLD 1975 Peshawar 252
In Mst. Zarina Jan, the propositus Shah Zaman left one daughter Mst. Akbar Jan and one predeceased son Mir Afzal's daughter Mst. Zarina Jan. There was no dispute that Mir Afzal and Mst. Akbar Jan would inherit 2/3 and 1/3 of the property respectively. The controversy was whether the whole of Mir Afzal's share would go to his only daughter Zarina Jan or not. To put it in the alternative, the question was whether Mir Afzal's Sister Akbar Jan would also inherit from him according to the Shariat or not. The problem may be presented through a graphical presentation:
The lower Appellate Court held:
Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 has given a right to the heirs of a pre-deceased son to inherit the share of their father in the property of their grand father. This section has not ousted the application of Shariat in other matters of inheritance and it has just given a right to the heirs of a pre-deceased son to inherit the share of their father in the property of their grandfather. Thus Shariat will apply to the inheritance of Mir Afzal, father of Mst Zarina Jan. 4 In other words Mst Zarina Jan would inherit ½ of the 2/3 of the estate to which her father Mir Afzal was entitled and the other half would go to Mst Akbar Jan, the sister of Mir Afzal. At the end the gross allocation shall be: Mst Zarina Jan would get ½ of 2/3 = 1/3 and Mst Akbar Jan would get ½ of 2/3 plus 1/3 = 2/3 of the property. However, The Lahore High Court explained the philosophy behind Section 4 of the MFLO, 1961:
The starting point is, that notionally the off spring of the propositus is deemed to be alive for the purpose of succession, at the time of the death of the propositus, and the succession of the grandchild is to be calculated again notionally as if the parent of the grandchild died after the death of the original propositus. Whether it was not the intention of law-making in section 4 of the Family Laws Ordinance, 1962, to provide an opportunity of obtaining only Islamic law shares, to the children of the predeceased son or daughter of the propositus and that intention was not to increase their Islamic Law shares. The Ordinance does not say that the orphaned grandchild will receive that share of the grandparent's estate to which he would be entitled (1) on the assumption that the predeceased parent had been alive at the time of the grandparent's death, and (2) on the further assumption that the predeceased parent had then died leaving his notional share of the grandparents' estate to be distributed among his heirs.
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To Carroll, as the purpose of the legislation is to improve the position of orphaned grandchild, it is hardly surprising that she would receive a larger share than she would have received under the traditional law.
10 Dr. Alamgir Muhammad Sirajuddin also is not wondered to see that in the prevailing 'mood of conservatism' the Pakistan Supreme Court would confirm the Lahore decision in 1990 and 'strike at the root of Section 4'. Firstly, section 4 may be seen as a sort of insurance for the orphaned grandchildren. It is a cardinal principle of law of insurance that under no circumstances the insured is allowed to benefit more than the loss suffered by him. This is because, if that were so, the temptation would always be there to desire the insured event and thus to obtain the policy proceeds.
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Under the Peshawar High Court scheme, the grandchildren would be benefited more if their parents predecease their grandfather. Now they shall get the whole of their parent's share, which they would otherwise have to share with other heirs of their parents like the case of Zarina Jan above. The sole spirit of shariah is to ensure the sanctity of life of the propositus. That is why there is no vested right recognized in Islam and a murderer is excluded from inheritance. Who knows due to the interpretation of Peshawar High Court, now a daughter would wish her parents predecease her grandparents! Secondly, what section 4 aims at is justice for the otherwise excluded and destitute orphans. Justice will be done if they are substituted in the position in which they would have been had their parent survived. To do justice to the orphans we cannot do injustice towards others. Say for example, the case of a widow whose husband died before her father-in-law. Now her sons and daughters would get whole of her husbands share in exclusion of her. Had her husband not died before her father-in-law, she would have a share in her husband's estate. Who shall do justice to her?
In Lieu of Conclusion
Bangladesh inherited, with many other laws, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 from Pakistan with the controversial provision in Section 4. Although no one, unlike the cases in Pakistan, has challenged this section, 13 the question -whether the change brought by the section is justified or notshould not go unexamined and unanswered. I think Bangladesh should amend Section 4 of MLFO to address the per stripes succession from its right perspective.
